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Message from the Editors
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on Irregular
Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary mission is
twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular Warfare into the
Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curricula; and second, to
bring operators, practitioners, and scholars together to share their
knowledge and experiences about a vast array of violent and non-violent
irregular challenges. This case study is part of an ongoing effort at CIWAG
that includes symposia, lectures by world-renowned academics, case
studies, research papers, articles, and books. Our aim is to make these case
studies part of an evolving and adaptive curriculum that fulfills the needs of
students preparing to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world.
This case study by Charlie Winter makes use of primary source
documents to present the in-theater propaganda strategies of the Islamic
State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Although much attention has rightly been
paid to their online recruiting and social media campaigns, their in-theater
strategies are equally compelling and strategically targeted. The author uses
a three-part framework—message, messenger, and media—developed by
Naval War College professors Marc Genest, Andrea Dew, and Sally Paine
in another study on strategic communications, to assess the intent and
effectiveness of ISIS’s in-theater propaganda. Winter makes a compelling
case, through evidence and teaching questions, that this strategy is both
deliberate and effective, especially when ISIS controlled and limited access
to the internet and outside media.
This has far-reaching implications for areas in Syria and Iraq that
were under ISIS control. What deeply embedded ideas did children and
teenagers internalize from this indoctrination media? What long-term
repercussions does this hold for stability and security in these areas? The
study also raises the questions of which other armed groups might adopt
these effective methodologies and under what circumstances in-theater
propaganda campaigns might be disrupted. As ISIS and al-Qaeda continue
2
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to inspire and sponsor new franchises around the globe, the issue of how to
control access to counter-narratives becomes more urgent; this first look at
in-theater strategies provides the basis for further research and investigation
into the in-theater and online competition for ideas and influence around the
world.
It is important to note two critical caveats to this case study. First,
the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author and do
not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval War
College, or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made to correct
any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately responsible for the
content of this case study.
We hope you find this case study useful, and look forward to hearing
your feedback and suggestions for how you can contribute to the Center on
Irregular Warfare & Armed Group’s mission here at the Naval War College.

3
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I. Introduction
“Hello, I’m John Cantlie, and today we’re in Mosul in Iraq.
As the war between the Islamic State and the U.S.-led
coalition continues, the Americans have launched a
surprising new tactic against the mujahidin. Using their $30
million F-18s and $100,000 missile systems, they have
begun targeting—not tanks, not trucks, not even the
mujahidin—but Islamic State media kiosks.
“This used to be one such media kiosk, targeted and
destroyed the other day on this busy high street. The kiosks
are used to distribute pamphlets and information regarding
the Islamic State, and serve to expose some of the lies and
propaganda that the Western media continues to peddle in
their never-ending mission to tarnish the image of the
Islamic State. It’s not much to look at because it cost about
$50 to build, and now it’s been flattened by the collective
might of the American war machine.
“And one has to ask oneself, why bother? Is it a ruse
by the CIA to somehow undermine the Islamic State’s
message to the Muslims of Mosul, and therefore somehow
diminish their control of the city? Is it, perhaps, to strike fear
into the hearts of the mujahidin, thereby abandoning any
ideas to build another dozen kiosks to replace this one?”1
***
“My media operative brother, let it be known that your
verbal jihad is not limited to speech alone, but also
Islamic State, “John Cantlie talks about the American airstrikes on media kiosks in Mosul city,”
A’maq News Agency, 19 March 2016, accessed 5 May 2017 at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YqIDeN_e_YE.
1
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comprises speech, composition, printing, audio recording
and preparing scenarios for video recording and so on. All
of this requires a significant amount of effort. Let it also be
known that, for you, verbal jihad is more important than
jihad of the sword.”2
In the wake of its capture of Mosul in 2014, the so-called Islamic
State came to present a unique security threat to its adversaries around the
world: in the space of a few years, it had managed to attract tens of
thousands of new supporters from as many as 86 nations,3 inspire selfstarter terrorism with far greater frequency than al-Qa’ida,4 and become a
household brand that enjoyed a regular slot in the mainstream media.5 In all
this, its propaganda machine played an integral role. 6 Consequently,
subverting it became a central objective of the international coalition that
was formed to degrade and destroy the group in 2014.7 However, coalition
member states tended to be overly fixated on the online presence of
Islamic State [Author’s translation], “Media operative, you are a mujahid, too,” Himma Library,
April 2016, accessed 5 May 2017 at https://archive.org/details/mojahed_ilamee_is.
3 Richard Barrett et al., “An updated assessment of the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq,”
The Soufan Group, December 2015, accessed 5 May 2017 at http://soufangroup.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf.
4 Islamic State was tied to dozens of terrorist plots or attacks against the West between 2014 and
2017. “#Terror gone viral: Overview of the 75 ISIS-linked plots against the West, 2014-2016,”
Homeland Security Committee, March 2016, accessed 5 May 2017 at
https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Report-Terror-Gone-Viral-1.pdf; also, see
Ray Sanchez et al., “ISIS goes global: Over 60 attacks in 20 countries,” CNN, 21 January 2016,
accessed 5 May 2017 at http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/mapping-isis-attacks-around-theworld/.
5 Barrett et al., “An updated assessment.”
6 Abu ‘Abdullah al-Masri, “Chapter X: Administration of media,” Principles in the Administration
of the Islamic State, trans. by Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, published by The Guardian, 7 December
2015, accessed 5 May 2017 at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/07/islamic-statedocument-masterplan-for-power.
7 For example, the topic of propaganda was a key feature in President Barack Obama’s remarks at
the Leaders’ Summit on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism in September 2015. “Remarks by
President Obama at the Leaders’ Summit on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism,” The White
House Briefing Room, 29 September 2015, accessed 5 May 2017 at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/29/remarks-president-obamaleaders-summit-countering-isil-and-violent.
2
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propaganda, an issue that persistently distracted them from what was
arguably developing into a more intractable communications conundrum—
the group’s offline propaganda operations in Syria and Iraq.
This case study shows that during its formative years as selfproclaimed caliphate, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s group used propaganda to
perpetuate its existence, consolidate political control, and expand its
strategic depth in a manner that was highly reminiscent of past totalitarian
regimes. To analyze this, we have to consider that the tens of thousands of
official photo reports, videos, audio messages, magazines, and chants
produced by the Islamic State between 2014 and 2017 were not intended
merely for Internet consumption; rather, they were also aimed at a domestic
audience, the people over whom the Islamic State ruled.8 Hence, while most
of our attention has been focused on the threat posed by returnee foreign
fighters or self-starter terrorists, we must now also contemplate the longterm implications of the Islamic State’s systematic indoctrination operations
in Iraq and Syria, and consider how they stand to affect local, regional, and
international security for years to come.
The analysis that follows is based predominantly on Arabiclanguage primary source materials—propaganda, interviews with activists
in Iraq and Syria, and official documents. Considered together, these allow
for a detailed exploration of the Islamic State’s offline communication
strategy. The study proceeds as follows: after a brief theoretical discussion
in which I frame the organization as a totalitarian proto-state, I investigate
its media strategy from four angles: infrastructure, medium, messenger, and
message. First, I examine how the Islamic State disseminated propaganda
in its heartlands between 2014 and early 2017, focusing in particular on the
role of nuqat i’lamiyya (literally “media points”) and al-Bayan Radio. Next,
8

Steven Stalinsky and R. Sosnow were among the first to note and discuss this internal propaganda
in “The Islamic State (ISIS) establishes ‘Media Points’ in Syria, Iraq, Libya to indoctrinate
caliphate citizens and enhance its activities on the ground: A one-year review,” MEMRI Inquiry &
Analysis Series 1190, October 2015, accessed 5 May 2017 at http://cjlab.memri.org/analysis-andspecial-reports/the-islamic-state-isis-establishes-media-points-in-syria-iraq-libya-to-indoctrinatecaliphate-citizens-and-enhance-its-cyber-activities-on-the-ground-a-one-year-review-2/.
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I discuss its full spectrum approach toward propaganda, one that
incorporated a wide range of media. Then, I explore the group’s policy of
censorship and information monopoly, paying special attention to its
gradualist war on satellite television and free access to the Internet. Lastly,
I analyze the “reality” constructed by its propagandists, and discuss the
consequences of its most comprehensive approach towards shaping the
narrative space.
It is clear that the Islamic State long had a highly nuanced approach
towards domestic public diplomacy, one that was set to have lasting
reverberations on an international scale, even though it remained under the
radar for years. With this in mind, in the conclusion I consider what might
happen in the aftermath of the Islamic State’s military defeat, and discuss
the importance of undermining this most subtle yet stubborn facet of its
insurgent governance.

9

WINTER: EVALUATING THE ISLAMIC STATE’S IN-THEATER PROPAGANDA
OPERATIONS

II. The Islamic State as a Totalitarian Proto-State
In 1965, at the height of the Cold War, Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew
Brzezinski published an analysis of totalitarian dictatorship. Although it
was originally intended to present a framework for evaluating the structure
of Cold War states, it provides an uncanny blueprint for understanding the
Islamic State’s propaganda strategies and successes.9 According to their
theory, in order to qualify as totalitarian, a ruling elite must possess the
following characteristics: an elaborate ideology; a single mass party led by
one man; a policing system based on terror; a near-complete monopoly of
arms; a centrally controlled economy; and, crucially, control of the mass
media.10
In the wake of its caliphal upgrade in June 2014, the Islamic State
met all of these criteria, albeit to varying degrees of sophistication: an
austere interpretation of salafi-jihadism underwrote its politics;11 a cultic
“caliph” led it;12 its intelligence apparatus was diffuse, potent, and
ruthless;13 it strove and, for the most part, succeeded, to hold the monopoly
on violence in its heartlands;14 its economy was centrally administered by a
formal ministry, the Diwan Bayt al-Mal;15 and, it was in pursuit of absolute
9

Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1965.
10 Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 22.
11 Cole Bunzel, “From paper state to caliphate: The ideology of the Islamic State,” The Brookings
Institution, No. 19, March 2015, accessed 5 May 2017 at https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/The-ideology-of-the-Islamic-State.pdf.
12 Matt Bradley, “ISIS declares new Islamist caliphate,” The Wall Street Journal, 29 June 2014,
accessed 5 May 2017 at https://www.wsj.com/articles/isis-declares-new-islamist-caliphate1404065263.
13 See, for example, Islamic State, “Allah will suffice you against them II,” Euphrates Province
Media Office, July 2016, accessed 5 May 2017 at http://jihadology.net/2016/07/27/new-videomessage-from-the-islamic-state-and-god-will-be-sufficient-for-you-against-them-wilayat-al-furat/.
14 Jay Akbar, “ISIS barbarians use meat cleaver to chop off hand and foot of two suspected thieves
as hundreds of men and young boys,” The Daily Mail, 2 July 2015, accessed 5 May 2017 at
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3146928/ISIS-barbarians-use-meat-cleaver-chop-handfoot-two-suspected-thieves-hundreds-men-young-boys-watch-on.html.
15 Borzou Daragahi, “ISIS declares its own currency,” The Financial Times, 13 November 2016,
accessed 4 May 2017 at https://www.ft.com/content/baf893e0-6b4f-11e4-9337-00144feabdc0.
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control over the mass media.16 So, while it may be true that for structural
reasons al-Baghdadi’s caliphate was never as intensely despotic as, say, the
regimes of Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, or present-day North Korea, its
state-building project seemed to be crafted along similar totalitarian lines.
For that reason, the group can usefully be understood as a totalitarian protostate, one that strove to realize the trappings of Friedrich and Brzezinski’s
model over the course of its first few years as a caliphate.
With this in mind, it serves to briefly touch upon how past
totalitarian regimes have used propaganda. When applied in this context,
propaganda is more than just a tool for persuasion. If leveraged alongside
fear, it offers the ruling elite a way “to impress its formula on the masses”
while concurrently undermining their very ability to resist—as French
philosopher Jacques Ellul put it, propaganda can be used to “attack the
individual, break down his resistance, [and] make his decisions for him.”17
In this sense, it is both a carrot with which to buoy the morale of supporters,
and a stick with which to coerce adversaries into submission. If executed
effectively by the totalitarian state, propaganda offers a way to substitute
spontaneously formed public opinion with the “official image of the
world,” and undermine dissidence in its most nascent stages.18
From 2014 onwards in its heartlands in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic
State adopted a communication policy akin to the above. Indeed, alBaghdadi’s organization seemed to be working towards the very same
strategic ends as totalitarians of bygone years, apparently hoping to use a
cocktail of information, disinformation, and censorship to crush dissent and
establish its ideological permanence. In the following pages, I explain how
and why this came to be, making occasional reference to the means by
16

See al-Masri, Principles, trans. by al-Tamimi.
John R. Palmer, “Theories of social change and the mass media,” The Journal of Aesthetic
Education, 5 (1971), 145; Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, 1965,
trans. by Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner, New York: Random House Vintage Books, 1973, 18.
18 C.W. Cassinelli, “Totalitarianism, ideology, and propaganda,” The Journal of Politics, 22 (Feb.
1960), 93; Paul Kecskemeti, “Totalitarian communications as a means of control: A note on the
sociology of propaganda,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, 14 (1950), 224.
17
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which propaganda was used in Nazi Germany in the 1930s and 1940s. As
will be seen, similarities abound between the Islamic State’s strategic
communication operations and those of Hitler’s Third Reich.

12
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III. The Infrastructure
In January 2017, the Islamic State released a video documentary
about its defense of the city of Mosul.19 Coming 100 days after the
campaign to recapture the city was first launched, the video was typically
over-produced—rich in computer-generated graphics and synth-assisted
chants. Reminiscent of the group’s other Mosul-related propaganda, the
focus of the video was its industrialized use of suicide operations. What
made it remarkable, though, was a segment in which it focused on the
“knights of the media” that had taken up arms, cameras, and suicide vests
to fight in the city.
Of particular note was an interview with a pre-adolescent media
worker who relayed to the camera that he had joined the Islamic State some
nine months earlier. He spoke in detail of his training and development in
the organization, a narrative that was accompanied by never-before-seen
footage from inside one of the Islamic State’s so-called “institutes” for
media training, a scene of highly disciplined, militaristic education. For the
first time, Islamic State students of propaganda could be seen on film,
wearing military garb and sitting at desks, listening to their instructors as
they prepared the drone systems in front of them for battlefield surveillance
and media production. In those brief seconds, the astonishing sophistication
of the group’s propaganda infrastructure was laid bare for all to see.
***
In 2016, the Islamic State released a series of videos documenting
its institutionalized war on satellite dishes.20 As well as focusing on what
Islamic State, “The knights of the ministries,” Nineveh Province Media Office, 24 January 2017,
accessed 3 May 2017 at http://heavy.com/news/2017/01/new-isis-islamic-state-video-knights-ofbureaucracy-mosul-iraq-wilayat-ninawa-modified-weaponized-drones-bombings-airstrikesuncensored-video/. The author prepared a detailed analysis of this video for IHS Markit.
20 Islamic State, “Destroying the satellite devices,” Raqqa Province Media Office, 31 May 2016,
accessed 3 May 2017 at https://videopress.com/v/8tu1dBs1; Islamic State, “Protect Yourselves and
19
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was being taken away, the propagandists spoke of what they were filling the
resultant information void with. They showed portacabins decked out with
widescreens and projectors, and media officials were depicted handing out
copies of the official newspaper to passersby, while another operative
briefed the cameras on the ever-evolving activities of al-Bayan Radio, the
official station that operated across the Islamic State’s heartlands in Iraq and
Syria for much of 2014, 2015, 2016, and some of 2017. This same official
concluded the video by saying that the Islamic State was working to make
a private “media point” out of every “Muslim house in the caliphate.”
***
“When you walk on the streets of Raqqa, there are big
screens that are showing beheadings. They have, you know,
the projectors and we are walking in the streets and just
watching these videos.”21
***
In the early summer of 2014, the Islamic State began its efforts to
wrest control over the information space in its heartlands once and for all.
It spearheaded this initiative with the establishment of a devoted
infrastructure for propaganda dissemination, a way for it to fight, “on an
internal front, to bring the truth” to the local population.22 The two most

Your Families from a Fire,” Khayr Province Media Office, 31 May 2016, accessed 3 May 2017 at
https://videopress.com/v/uWaFHbp2; Islamic State, “And Let the Believers Be Cautious Regarding
the Prevention of the Dish and Its Destruction,” Nineveh Province Media Office, 31 May 2016,
accessed 3 May 2017 at https://videopress.com/v/G3Pc0rYy. The author prepared a detailed
analysis of these videos for IHS Markit.
21 Excerpt of interview between unidentified wife of Islamic State member and CNN’s Arwa
Damon. See Arwa Damon, “Female commander fighting to liberate Raqqa,” CNN, 22 June 2017,
accessed 23 June 2017 at http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/2017.06.22.html.
22 Islamic State, “The media point: a window inside the media of the Islamic State,” Al-Naba’ XXI,
8 March 2016, accessed 5 May 2017 at https://archive.org/details/bedr27, 13.
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important components of this infrastructure were the nuqat i'lamiyya
(literally, “media points’)—makeshift propaganda offices that were often
nothing more than shipping containers equipped with projectors, printers,
and plastic chairs—and al-Bayan Radio.23 In this section, I explore the
instrumental role these institutions had in allowing the Islamic State to
market itself to the millions of Syrian and Iraqi civilians over which it ruled
between 2014 and 2017.24
Notwithstanding their rudimentary nature, media points, which were
present across the Islamic State’s territories as early as spring 2015, were
potent tools with which to expose civilians to the caliphate message. As well
as screening its films, they served as satellite publishing houses at which
propaganda was printed and circulated. For example, the organization used
media points in Syria and Iraq to disseminate all 50 issues of its 12,000-

Islamic State, “Aspect of the work of the media point in the city of Raqqa,” Raqqa Province
Media Office, 19 April 2017, accessed 19 April 2017 at https://justpaste.it/15owb; Islamic State,
“Aspect of the work of the media office in the province – the media point,” Khayr Province Media
Office, 8 March 2017, accessed 8 March 2017 at https://justpaste.it/149yq; Islamic State,
“Establishing a media point in the city of Tadmur,” Homs Province Media Office, 5 June 2015,
accessed 10 April 2017 at
https://khlafabook.wordpress.com/2015/06/05/%D9%87%D8%B0%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A9%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%86%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84/; Islamic State, “Opening a media point in the city of Sirte,” Tripoli Province
Media Office, 2 September 2015, accessed 10 April 2017 at
http://www.muslm.org/vb/showthread.php?530075-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A9/page956; Islamic State, “A
screening of Allah and His Messenger spoke the truth at the media point in the city of Raqqa,”
Raqqa Province Media Office, 22 April 2017, accessed 3 May 2017 at http://store6.up00.com/2017-04/149288054523111.jpg.
24 Eli Berman and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Why ISIL will fail on its own,” Politico, 29 November 2015,
accessed 5 May 2017 at http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/11/why-isil-will-fail-on-itsown-213401.
23
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word weekly newspaper, al-Naba’, in 2016.25,26 It also used media points as
digital distribution structures, facilities at which to burn electronic
magazines onto compact discs and flash drives before giving them out to
passersby free of charge.27 These activities were not just limited to towns
and cities; the Islamic State also rigged up vans so its propaganda could
reach even the remotest areas of Iraq and Syria, a practice distinctly
reminiscent of the mobile cinemas that roamed throughout rural Germany
in the 1930s and 1940s.28
Intended as substitutes for conventional news outlets, the Islamic
State’s media points were the principal tools through which it marketed
itself offline. At one and the same time, they were capable of delivering
news updates on its domestic and external war effort, projecting its utopian
narrative, and entrenching its existence within the local body politic.
Attendance was assured both by blatant intimidation and the host
population’s desire to appear loyal—after all, what better way to feign
support for a totalitarian insurgent group than to appear to voluntarily
consume its propaganda?29
Although it was already deeply entrenched by 2015, the media point
project was a relatively novel innovation.30 According to a written feature
25

As of 19 December 2015, al-Naba’ has been disseminated in electronic form, too, through the
Islamic State’s official propaganda disseminator, Nashir.
26 Islamic State, “Distributing the weekly al-Naba’ newspaper to ordinary Muslims,” Nineveh
Province Media Office, 19 November 2016, accessed 10 April 2017 at
https://dawaalhaq.com/post/57406; Islamic State, “Distributing al-Naba’ and video materials in
south Shirqat,” Dijla Province Media Office, 23 July 2016, accessed 10 April 2017 at
https://dawaalhaq.com/post/47966; Islamic State, “Distributing al-Naba’ in the city of Tal’afar,”
Jazira Province Media Office, 14 April 2017, accessed 14 April 2017 at https://justpaste.it/15j5i.
27 Interview between the author and activist from Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently, 15 June
2017; interview between the author and Waleed al-Fahdawi, Ramadi-based member of al-Bu Fahd
tribal militia, 4 June 2017; and interview between author and Khaled al-Homsi of the Palmyra
Coordination Committee, 31 May 2017.
28 See for example, the final sequence of Islamic State, “Raiding the villages to spread guidance,”
Aleppo Province Media Office, 4 May 2016, accessed 5 May 2017 at
https://videopress.com/v/KyiRyY1F; see also David Welch, The Third Reich: Politics and
Propaganda, London: Routledge, 2002, 121.
29 Interview between the author and Waleed al-Fahdawi, 4 June 2017.
30 Islamic State, “The media point,” 12-13.
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in the Islamic State’s newspaper, the first point was established in spring
2014 in the town of al-Bab in Aleppo province, geared towards
disseminating news in an environment that was
“lacking in
31
communications mechanisms.” Its declared aim was to “present media in
all of its forms to the ordinary people” of the region.32 Quite literally, the
propagandists intended it to be a “coupling link” between the Islamic State
organization and the people over whom it ruled.33 After its early successes
in al-Bab, the project became “one of the rudiments of [the Islamic State’s]
domestic media,” proliferating rapidly ahead of June 2014’s caliphate
declaration.34
By March 2016, the organization claimed that it had as many as 60
individual media points in Nineveh province—with 25 in the city of Mosul
alone—and a further 39 in Dijla province.35 In Raqqa, the symbolic seat of
the caliphate, activists asserted that there were “many in the city and its
environs.”36
Media points did not just emerge in places that the Islamic State
considered to be its heartlands. For example, soon after the Islamic State
captured Palmyra in Syria and Ramadi in Iraq in 2015, it set up media points
on thoroughfares in both cities.37 In Palmyra, just days elapsed before
Islamic State officials were broadcasting propaganda to the civilians
remaining in the city.38 In overtly military contexts, then, media points
seemed to be a way to normalize and entrench the group’s rule in areas
where its power had not yet been consolidated.
Complementing the media point project was al-Bayan Radio, the
Islamic State’s FM station, another institution that was set to become a
Islamic State, “The media point,” 12.
Islamic State, “The media point,” 12.
33 Islamic State, “The media point,” 12.
34 Islamic State, “The media point,” 13.
35 Islamic State, “The media point,” 12.
36 Interview between author and Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently, 15 June 2017.
37 Interview between author and Khaled al-Homsi, 31 May 2017; interview between author and
Waleed al-Fahdawi, 4 June 2017.
38 Interview between author and Khaled al-Homsi, 31 May 2017.
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critical part of the propagandists’ everyday operations from 2014 onwards.
Its most important product was the official daily bulletin, which provided a
World War II-style overview of the previous day’s military exploits and
enabled the organization to tactically respond to enemy propaganda.39 In
some places, listening to it was optional.40 In others, media officials forced
al-Bayan upon the local population by playing it on media point
loudspeakers for all to hear.41 It is difficult to overstate the importance of
the radio station—by 2017, it had become a vehicle for defensive and
offensive information operations, a way for the group to directly engage
with and repudiate reality on a regular, systematic basis.42
When it comes to the infrastructure behind the Islamic State’s
propaganda operations, similarities between it and past totalitarians abound.
Take, for instance, the Third Reich, which notoriously recognized the
importance of stacking the media cards against civilians by co-opting local
media structures to dictate official news. In 1930s Germany, radio sets,
attendance at theaters, and tickets to cinemas were all heavily subsidized by
the Nazi state, as its propaganda machine attempted to “manufacture a
consensus where one did not previously exist.”43 Moreover, at the height of
the Blitzkrieg, its military campaigns were offset with offensive radio
propaganda geared toward undermining the potential for resistance in the
target population.44 When the Islamic State was spreading across Iraq and
Syria in 2014 and 2015, it adopted a largely analogous strategy. As it

39

In a November 2015 issue of al-Naba’, the Islamic State published an al-Bayan Radio
infographic detailing nine FM radio stations—one in Libya, four in Syria, and four in Iraq—and
three operations centers—one in Syria and two in Iraq. Islamic State, “Bayan Radio Infographic,”
30 November 2015, accessed 5 May 2017 at https://dawaalhaq.com/post/33205.
40 Interview between author and Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently, 15 June 2017.
41 Interview between author and Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently, 15 June 2017.
42 At the time of writing, al-Bayan Radio bulletins are disseminated in Uyghur, Arabic, Turkish,
Kurdish, Russian, French, and English. In the eleventh issue of al-Naba’, an al-Bayan Radio
infographic notes the 12 “most important programs” for Rabi’ al-Awwal and Rabi’ al-Akhr 1437.
See Islamic State, “al-Naba’ XI: Wait, we are also waiting,” 29 December 2015, accessed 5 May
2017 at https://dawaalhaq.com/post/34790.
43 Welch, The Third Reich, 61.
44 Welch, The Third Reich, 124.
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advanced, it systematically took control of communications technology and
fought ferociously to seize radio stations, from which it would broadcast
news bulletins straight from the battlefield.45 Evidently, both totalitarians—
both the Nazi regime and the salafi-jihadist proto-state—considered media
infrastructure to be a sound investment, a way to communicate ideology and
construct reality on a lasting basis.46

“Alleged ISIS gunmen in Libya ‘seize radio station’,” AFP, 13 February 2015, accessed 5 May
2017 at http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/02/13/Alleged-ISIS-gunmen-inLibya-seize-radio-station-.html.
46 In February 2015, for example, Islamic State fighters captured a public radio station in Sirte,
Libya. Within hours, they were using it to transmit excerpts from speeches by Abu Muhammad al‘Adnani and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and calling upon their enemies to defect. See “Alleged ISIS
gunmen in Libya ‘seize radio station’,” AFP.
45
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IV. The Medium
“Propaganda must be total. The propagandist must utilize all
of the technical means at his disposal—the press, radio, TV,
movies, posters, meetings, door-to-door canvassing[.] There
is no propaganda as long as one makes use, in sporadic
fashion and at random, of a newspaper article here, a poster
or a radio program there, organizes a few meetings and
lectures, writes a few slogans on walls; that is not
propaganda.”47
***
In May 2016, the Islamic State’s media office in Aleppo province
released a video entitled Raiding the Villages to Spread Guidance.48 It
presented a case study into Islamic State outreach in the region’s most
remote villages, thereby providing important insight into the bureaucratic
and logistical structures behind the group’s local recruitment efforts. It
began with a media official claiming that there had been, in the months prior
to filming, a sudden surge in new recruits to the Islamic State that was a
result of two things: first, Islamic State propaganda; and, second, the
campaigns of the Office of Proselytization and Mosques, one of which
would be the subject of this video.
The account followed a team of recruiters as they traveled to a
number of mud brick villages, where they were shown engaging in what
was termed “the first stage of proselytization”—distributing leaflets
throughout the villages, putting particular focus on children. Next, footage
cut in showing a mosque in which dozens of prepubescent boys were
47

Ellul, Propaganda, 9.
Islamic State, “Raiding the villages to spread guidance,” Aleppo Province Media Office, 4 May
2016, accessed 5 May 2017 at https://videopress.com/v/KyiRyY1F. The author prepared a detailed
analysis of this video for IHS Markit.
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gathered for a “primary” course. They could be seen learning the Qur’an
by rote, being taught how to write, and playing educational games, before
the camera cut to an interview with an official who claimed that, in the last
five months alone, roughly 70,000 of these “cubs” had attended courses
delivered by him and his associates.
Next, a different official was filmed speaking about the courses that
were delivered specifically to women. He claimed that some 40,000 female
supporters had attended them in the last few months alone, resulting in a
situation in which mothers were signing their own children up to the Islamic
State’s military forces, and encouraging them to volunteer for suicide
operations.
On the tenth and final day of the campaign, the newly assimilated
villagers were shown collectively pledging allegiance to the caliph. After
the ceremony was concluded, a “da’wa caravan”—a colorfully decorated
truck equipped with loudspeakers—was shown hosting a celebration in the
village square, complete with comedy, singing, and copious amounts of
boiled sweets.
***
Even prior to 2014, the Islamic State had begun to adopt what has
been described by Ellul as a “total” propaganda strategy.49 It did not just
communicate with civilians through audiovisual media published on an
occasional basis. Rather, its propaganda cadres worked constantly to embed
themselves and their organization within the local population, using all
means of communication. Taking this into account, the group’s propaganda
efforts can be divided into two broad and overlapping categories.
The first is “consumed propaganda.” This comprises all media that
was watched, listened to, or read, and included the Islamic State’s
documentaries, current affairs features, radio programs, photographic
49

Ellul, Propaganda, 9.
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reports, newspapers, magazines, operation claims, theological literature,
infographics, posters, billboards, and so on. The second category, which
relied upon direct engagement, is the Islamic State’s “performative
propaganda.” Primarily delivered by officials working in the Media
Ministry, Office of Proselytization and Mosques, Education Ministry, and
Hisba Police, this kind of propaganda comprised choreographed
interactions between the Islamic State and its civilian population. Most of
the time, performative propaganda operations occurred at public spectacles
like executions and amputations, as well as town fairs, mosque sermons,
and school lessons. This category also includes propaganda that was not
staged as such, but spread by word of mouth—the Islamic State’s equivalent
of the Nazi “whispering campaigns,” or Mundpropaganda.50
Evidently, the Islamic State recognized the power of physical
presence, and that the act of media dissemination could itself become a
mechanism of propaganda. With that in mind, the group ensured that its
consumed propaganda was persistently iterated and reiterated in the course
of its performative propaganda operations, an approach that increased both
the durability and sustainability of its indoctrination efforts.

50

See Aristotle A. Kallis, Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War, New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005, 139-141.
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Image 1: DVDs being distributed in Tal’afar.51

Image 2: Islamic State fighters watching propaganda. 52

Islamic State, “Aspect of the distribution of Nineveh Province video release The procession of
light to normal Muslims in the city of Tal’afar,” Jazira Province Media Office, 12 April 2017,
accessed 12 April 2017 at https://justpaste.it/15fzl.
52 Islamic State, “Screening videos to those on the frontlines in the east of the province,”
Raqqa Province Media Office, 4 May 2017, accessed 4 May 2017 at https://justpaste.it/168le.
51
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Image 3: Poster for documentary about Bayan Radio in Mosul.53

Image 4: Islamic State fighters reading the newspaper in central Syria (note
infographic).54

Islamic State, “Bayan Radio in Nineveh Province,” Nineveh Province Media Office, 13 April
2015, accessed 4 May 2017 at https://archive.org/details/bayan_radio.
54 Islamic State, “Distribution of the weekly magazine al-Naba’ to those on the frontlines,” Hama
Province Media Office, 16 April 2017, accessed 16 April 2017 at https://justpaste.it/15ksm.
53
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Image 5: Newspaper being distributed to civilians in Tal’afar.55

Image 6: Da’wa literature being distributed in Raqqa.56

Islamic State, “Distribution of the weekly newspaper al-Naba’ in the city of Tal’afar,” Jazira
Province Media Office, 14 April 2017, accessed 14 April 2017 at https://justpaste.it/15j5i.
56 Islamic State, “The Da’wa Center—distributing da’wa literature to Muslims in Raqqa,” Raqqa
Province Media Office, 29 March 2017, accessed 29 March 2017 at https://justpaste.it/14z67.
55
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Image 7: A sermon in Mosul.57

Image 8: A billboard stipulating rules for womenswear in Damascus. 58

Islamic State, “Al-Sawwaf Mosque in Mosul,” Nineveh Province Media Office, 21 January
2017, accessed 21 January 2017 at https://justpaste.it/moswf.
58 Islamic State, “Aspect of the work of the Da’wa Office in Yarmuk Camp—preparing and setting
up billboards,” Damascus Province Media Office, 20 February 2017, accessed 20 February 2017 at
https://justpaste.it/15qnh.
57
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Image 9: A public spectacle in Mosul.59

Image 10: A mural being painted in Tabqa.60

Islamic State, “Whipping a cigarette smuggler in Mosul,” Nineveh Province Media Office, 5
February 2017, accessed 4 May 2017 at http://store6.up-00.com/2017-02/148629006471483.jpg.
60 Screenshot from Islamic State, Building Blocks, Raqqa Province Media Office, 5 February 2017,
accessed 4 May 2017 at https://archive.org/details/fff0110101_gmail_LBRQ_201702.
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V. The Messenger
In 2016, the Islamic State released three videos that focused on the
issue of information censorship in Syria and Iraq. The first, produced by
Raqqa province’s media office, was entitled Destroying the Satellite
Devices.61 Next was Nineveh province’s And Let the Believers Be Cautious
Regarding the Prevention of the Dish and Its Destruction.62 Third was
Khayr province’s Ward Yourselves and Your Families Away from Fire.63
The three videos, which lasted between nine and thirteen minutes,
closely resembled each other, with each fusing together interviews with
religious policemen, media officials, and civilian supporters of the Islamic
State. At the beginning of each, the propagandists alleged that the
“Crusader coalition” had launched an all-out information war against Sunni
Islam in general and the Islamic State in particular. They went on to explain
that, because of this, satellite broadcasting—the coalition’s “chief weapon”
in this war—must cease immediately, and all associated technologies be
destroyed.
An official in the Khayr province video was depicted reprimanding
parents who permitted their children to watch satellite television, claiming
that they were willfully corrupting the next generation of the Islamic State’s
mujahidin. Another official, this time in Raqqa province, could be viewed
castigating the masses for allowing satellite dishes to distract them from the
teachings of the Qur’an. Because of satellite television, he held, “corrupt

Islamic State, “Destroying the satellite devices,” Raqqa Province Media Office, 31 May 2016,
accessed 3 May 2017 at https://videopress.com/v/8tu1dBs1. The author prepared a detailed analysis
of this video for IHS Markit.
62 Islamic State, “And Let the Believers Be Cautious Regarding the Prevention of the Dish and Its
Destruction,” Nineveh Province Media Office, 31 May 2016, accessed 3 May 2017 at
https://videopress.com/v/G3Pc0rYy. The author prepared a detailed analysis of this video for IHS
Markit.
63 Islamic State, “Protect Yourselves and Your Families from a Fire,” Khayr Province Media
Office, 31 May 2016, accessed 3 May 2017 at https://videopress.com/v/uWaFHbp2. The author
prepared a detailed analysis of this video for IHS Markit.
61
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practices” like democracy were able to take root among Muslims. For these
reasons, their destruction was a shari’a imperative.
After justifying why censorship was necessary, the propagandists
went on to examine how the policy was actually being implemented.
Throughout all the videos, emphasis was placed upon public consent and
cooperation. Gatherings in Mosul showed civilians, young and old,
shattering their satellite receivers with glee; likewise, residents of Raqqa
were depicted as willing enforcers of the new laws; and supporters in
Syria’s Deir ez-Zor governorate could be observed enthusiastically
dismissing instruments of “Crusader” propaganda, and announcing that
they preferred to consume the Islamic State’s media instead.
***
As Ellul noted in 1962, for a totalitarian propaganda strategy to be
truly effective, a particular set of logistical circumstances is required.64 In
essence, he held that the ruling elite must strive to be the sole messenger
when engaging with an audience. Hence, he contended, totalitarians must
exert full control—or something close to it—over the mass media.65 In the
age of digital communication, the totalitarian’s information monopoly
cannot stop there; it must comprise all forms of new media as well.66
Given the advances in communications technology that occurred in
recent years, “true monopoly is now very rare.”67 Nevertheless, the Islamic
State still pursued one after announcing its caliphate in 2014. Like any
totalitarian movement, external channels of information running against its
particular party line posed a long-term destabilizing threat. Hence, from
2014 onwards, the group set about physically removing or ideologically
discrediting them. Seemingly cognizant of the fact that immediately
64

Ellul, Propaganda, 9.
Ellul, Propaganda, 102.
66 Ellul, Propaganda, 22.
67 Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory (6th edition), New York: Sage Publications, 195.
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withdrawing civilian access to the outside world would have risked
irreparably harming its appeal, it opted for an incremental approach toward
censorship. Between 2014 and early 2017, it worked gradually, at times
imperceptibly, to inhibit access to the Internet, jam radio signals, and ban
satellite dishes (which it at one point condemned as ‘adu min al-dakhil—
“an enemy within”).68
To be sure, it would be wrong to overstate the extent of the Islamic
State’s censorship program; even at its height, it was only ever a partial
success. In 2017, activists living in Raqqa reported to the author that the
Islamic State had legislatively forbidden use of the Internet soon after its
capture of the city, but that enforcing the ban was easier said than done and,
for that reason, it had out of necessity been more flexible than its laws
suggested.69 That being said, the activists also noted that, while it may have
On 2 December 2015, the Islamic State’s Department of Hisba released a statement banning
satellite TV transmitters due to their insidious spreading of “deceit, lies, and defamation.” By the
end of the month, this statement had been officially translated into English and Farsi. In the weeks
that followed, al-Naba’ featured an infographic detailing the seven central evils of satellite
transmission, which was subsequently translated into English. Islamic State, “The banning of
satellite receivers,” Department of Hisba, 6 December 2015, accessed 3 May 2017 at
http://www.all4syria.info/Archive/278488; Islamic State, “The banning of satellite TV receivers,”
Diwan al-Hisbah, 30 December 2015, accessed 3 May 2017 at
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2016/1/19/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9
%82%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1; Islamic State, “al-Naba’ XI: Wait, we
are also waiting,” 29 December 2015, accessed 3 May 2017 at https://archive.org/details/nbaa11;
Islamic State, “Purifying the homes of the Muslims from satellite dish receivers,” Hisba
Committee, 17 May 2016, accessed 3 May 2017 at
http://www.anapress.net/ar/articles/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/217792837
947810/-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%B2%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A-..%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1.
69 Interview between author and Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently, 15 June 2017.
68
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been relatively easy to access the Internet in early 2014, “it became harder
to do so in 2015, and even harder in 2016 and 2017.”70,71 Indeed, by early
2017, Raqqa’s once myriad Internet cafes had been whittled down to just a
handful, each of which was run by Islamic State supporters who recorded
customers’ names and facilitated regular police inspections.72
The group’s attempts to crack down on satellite television followed
a similar trajectory. After months of legal ambiguity on the matter, it began
to take a more proactive stance towards the end of 2015, eventually
threatening citizens with “severe punishment” if they were caught using
satellite dishes.73 So, once again, while its stated position was long clear, it
was quite some time before the organization actually began implementing
it.74
In Mosul, the situation was similar, though initially less advanced.
According to its residents, public Internet cafes faced similar regulations to
those implemented in Raqqa, but private Internet usage remained fairly
popular.75 And, again like in Raqqa, measures taken against the use of
satellite dishes were piecemeal until the summer of 2016, with many
citizens continuing to watch television news surreptitiously in spite of the
Islamic State’s efforts to stop them.76 Notwithstanding this reluctance to
bend to the group’s totalitarian will, satellite broadcasting and Internet

70

Interview between author and Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently, 15 June 2017.
As an aside, it is worth noting that private Internet access only continued as it did throughout this
period because the citizens of Raqqa had already spent years circumventing Assad regime
censorship, something that gave rise to an informal network of satellite-powered Wi-Fi that not
even the Islamic State could shut down. Michael Weiss, “ISIS’s jihad against WiFi,” The Daily
Beast, 21 July 2015, accessed 25 May 2017 at
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/21/isis-s-jihad-against-wifi.html.
72 Interview between author and Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently, 15 June 2017.
73 Interview between author and Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently, 15 June 2017.
74 As signified by the release of Islamic State, “Destroying the satellite devices,” Raqqa Province
Media Office, 31 May 2016, accessed 3 May 2017 at https://videopress.com/v/8tu1dBs1.
75 Heather Murdock, “Staying online in dangerous times,” VOA News, 22 January 2017, accessed
27 June 2017 at https://projects.voanews.com/mosul/profile/59221-staying-online-in-dangeroustimes.
76 “Satellite dishes reconnect post-IS Mosul to world,” AFP, 20 April 2017, accessed 27 June 2017
at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/afp/2017/04/iraq-conflict-jihadists-television.html.
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access were severely hampered over the years, as the Islamic State sought
to isolate the civilian population from the rest of the world.77
In Raqqa and Mosul, it seemed that the group was relatively
cautious, intent on preserving the fragile acquiescence of the local
population. The same cannot be said of towns and cities that were of lesser
strategic value to it, especially those that were seized after protracted
military campaigns. In Palmyra, for example, the Islamic State
circumvented any pretense of censorship gradualism and enforced a de facto
ban on the Internet by refusing to repair any of the cyber infrastructure that
had been so crippled during its seizure of the city in May 2015.78 Likewise,
in Ramadi, it banned the Internet by the same means, though it did
eventually permit some limited access alongside mobile telephony,
provided it took place in custom-built, Islamic State-administered “halls.”79
In these facilities, the activities of attendees were carefully monitored, with
screens being checked as often as every five minutes.80
As a cumulative result of these policies, credible news that ran
contrary to the Islamic State’s propaganda was structurally challenged in
the group’s heartlands. Whether in Iraq or Syria, verifiable reports about the
coalition’s efforts were scarce, and the tidbits that did get past the caliphate
firewall were often obscured by Islamic State disinformation. Conspiracy
theories ran amok, and confusion as to the coalition's real aims blossomed.81
Crucially, too, the Islamic State’s official propaganda narrative emerged as
the only constant, a point that is revisited in the next section.
To summarize, the Islamic State benefitted from its attempted
communications monopoly in three main ways: first, it enabled the group
Similar to in Raqqa, the Islamic State’s ramped up anti-satellite television measures were
signified by the release of the Islamic State, “And Let the Believers Be Cautious Regarding the
Prevention of the Dish and Its Destruction,” Nineveh Province Media Office, 31 May 2016,
accessed 3 May 2017 at https://videopress.com/v/G3Pc0rYy.
78 Interview between author and Khaled al-Homsi, 31 May 2017.
79 Interview between the author and Waleed al-Fahdawi, 4 June 2017.
80 Interview between the author and Waleed al-Fahdawi, 4 June 2017.
81 “Satellite dishes reconnect post-IS Mosul to world,” AFP, 20 April 2017, accessed 27 June 2017
at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/afp/2017/04/iraq-conflict-jihadists-television.html.
77
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to mitigate operational risks presented by the almost ubiquitous mobile
phone cameras that were present across its heartlands (photographs could
be taken, but not easily uploaded);82 second, it allowed the Islamic State’s
central media foundations to narrowly dictate their propaganda line;83 third,
and most important in this context, it limited the access that ordinary
civilians had to the outside world. While many fighters were ideologically
committed to pursuing the goals of the Islamic State, the majority of people
ruled by it in Syria and Iraq were not, and only lived in the caliphate because
they had no better alternative.84 In this sense, they posed a critical, but latent,
security risk to the caliphate, which seemingly determined that if it limited
the civilian population’s ability to access outside channels of information,
any rebellious spirit would be derailed almost as soon as it emerged.
Particularly in places like Mosul and Raqqa, this approach seemed to pay
off—indeed, in spite of persistent coalition backing and communiqués on
the matter, there was no mass uprising in either city, even when the Islamic
State’s position was at its most perilous.85
At this stage, it serves to return to the comparison with the Third
Reich. Like the Islamic State, the Nazi regime was notoriously “afraid of
enemy propaganda” and went to great lengths to undermine and restrict
access to channels of information that ran against, or could be seen to run
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As was widely publicized by the coalition in June 2015, photographs could be used against the
group in airstrike planning. Louisa Loveluck, “‘Moron’ militant’s selfie leads to US air raid on Isil
unit,” The Telegraph, 4 June 2015, accessed 3 May 2017 at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11652942/Moron-militants-selfie-leadsto-US-air-raid-on-Isil-unit.html. As journalists moved into territories seized from the group in
2017, it soon became clear that at least some Islamic State fighters were keen amateur
photographers. See, for example, Quentin Somerville and Riam Dalati, “The secret lives of young
IS fighters,” BBC News, 23 June 2017, accessed 25 September 2017 at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/is_fighters.
83 Al-Masri, Principles, trans. by al-Tamimi.
84 Berman and Shapiro, “Why ISIL will fail on its own.”
85 Martin Chulov, “Anti-ISIS resistance group plans to rise up in Mosul, say residents,” The
Guardian, 19 October 2016, accessed 3 May 2017 at
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against, the party line.86 Concurrently, it coordinated and centralized official
information as much as possible in order to maximize narrative coherence.87
After it seized Mosul in 2014, the Islamic State adopted a similar approach,
albeit one that was inhibited by the situational exigencies it faced. It worked
assiduously to disrupt and discredit non-Islamic State information flows,
attempting to force new subjects—whether they were supporters or
adversaries—to defer to its version of events alone. Notably, its approach
was more gradualist in places where its presence was based more upon
consent than coercion. In any case, there is little doubt about what the
Islamic State was pursuing through the activities outlined above: its media
strategists wanted to complement their propaganda infrastructure with a
watertight information monopoly.

Leonard W. Doob, “Goebbels’ principles of propaganda,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 14
(1950), 429.
87 Doob, “Goebbels’ principles of propaganda,” 430.
86
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VI. The Message
In early 2017, the Islamic State released a video entitled Building
Blocks. Produced and disseminated by Raqqa province’s media office, the
documentary-style film was one of the most fine-tuned manifestations of
the Islamic State’s utopia narrative to date. After opening with a brief
montage of military propaganda—Islamic State soldiers preparing their
weapons before operations and firing off mortars into the distance—the
video changed tack, shifting its focus away from the martial Islamic State
toward the civilian Islamic State. Vivid scenes of sunsets, playgrounds,
fishing, and markets cut across the screen, as the narrator spoke of the twin
pillars of the Islamic State caliphate—shura (consultation) and shari’a
(law)—before he set out the roles of its various ministries, which covered
all aspects of life in the caliphate, whether they were “administrative,
judicial, security-related, services-related, religious, or health-related.”
The video went on to showcase the various “building blocks” of
caliphal governance in Raqqa. First, there was the Office of Proselytization
and Mosques; next was the Education Office, followed by the Traffic
Police, Social Welfare Committee, Health Ministry, Emergency Services
Office, Street Repair Committee, Bureau for Electricity and Water,
Municipal Services, Media Centers, Inspections Office, Transport
Department, and Bakeries Administration.
The “important work” of each of these departments was then
exhibited in a series of video clips depicting everything from supermarket
inspections to fire trucks, traffic police, and schooling. One of the civilian
workers interviewed during this vignette announced that, “by the will of
God, job opportunities have blossomed, the economy has boomed, and trade
has increased.”
88

Islamic State, “Building blocks,” Raqqa Province Media Office, 5 February 2017, accessed 3
May 2017 at https://dawaalhaq.com/post/63614. The author prepared a detailed analysis of this
video for IHS Markit.
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The remainder of the video flitted between mosque seminars, roads,
water purification stations, and power plants. As the propagandists
meandered between these various walks of Islamic State life, they
interviewed a series of individuals who alleged that they were elated at their
lives in the caliphate, which were, they contended, on the whole more
successful and more rewarding than they had been under the Assad regime.
One electricity engineer even said: “I worked for 12 years for the regime
and, thanks be to God, now I am an employee of the Islamic State. Thanks
be to God, the difference is big, both professionally and personally. Now,
you get to work with others, other Muslim brothers. Thanks be to God, it’s
a big, big difference.”
***
While the prevailing media narrative regarding the Islamic State’s
message has tended to focus on its brutality, in reality, the organization’s
propaganda was always varied, incorporating a complex thematic cocktail
of positivity and negativity. Reflecting their totalitarian inclinations, alBaghdadi’s propagandists worked to refract as many aspects of existence
through their caliphal lens as possible. When considered in aggregate, the
picture they painted was a complicated fusion of ideas that loosely revolved
around three nebulous and non-discrete themes: victimhood, warfare, and
utopianism.89
Perhaps the most potent aspect of Islamic State media were its vivid
representations of millenarian utopia—the photographic essays and videos
that showed everything from farms and markets to street cleaners and

See Charlie Winter, “The virtual caliphate: Understanding Islamic State's propaganda strategy,”
Quilliam, July 2015, accessed 3 May 2017 at http://www.stratcomcoe.org/charlie-winter-virtualcaliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy; and Charlie Winter, “Documenting the
virtual caliphate,” Quilliam, October 2015, accessed 3 May 2017 at
http://truevisiontv.com/uploads/websites/39/wysiwyg/doctors/jihad/FINAL-documenting-thevirtual-caliphate.pdf.
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maternity wards.90 While this kind of propaganda almost always went
unnoticed in mainstream news coverage, it was instrumental to the Islamic
State’s appeal, contributing as it did to an unparalleled picture of euphoric,
efficient, and functioning “Islamic” rule. It was this offer of a seemingly
viable, certainly radical alternative to the status quo that gave the group the
edge over its salafi-jihadist rivals, who, lest it be forgotten, were competing
for the same scarce resources—namely, recruits and donors.
That being said, it is crucial to recognize that the Islamic State’s
propaganda was never just geared toward recruiting new members and
attracting donors. Rather, it was just as much—if not more—produced in
order to sustain the morale of current supporters and convince them that
they remained on the right path. To this end, the propagandists used
audiovisual media to bolster the perception that their “state” was as
contiguous as it was transnational. They constructed an alternate
propagandistic reality, one that was conveyed by a persistent stream of
multimedia content—at its height, some 35 individual products each day—
drawn from a range of locations and focusing on multiple themes.91 While
the scope of its propaganda declined from 2015 onwards, even at its lowest
ebb the group was circulating about 20 unique propaganda products each
day: in early 2017, for example, it disseminated no fewer than 570
individual pieces of propaganda in a single month.92
On any given day—in this case, 12 January 2017—civilians in the
caliphate would be force-fed images of anything from theology
competitions, industrial pipe factories, and sheep markets to military
Islamic State, “A Friday market in the village of al-‘Aluliyya,” Jazira Province Media Office, 28
April 2017, accessed 28 April 2017 at https://justpaste.it/1618y; Islamic State, “Agricultural work
in the countryside of the province,” Raqqa Province Media Office, 18 March 2017, accessed 18
March 2017 at https://justpaste.it/14l71; Islamic State, “Aspect of the work of the Services Center,”
Khayr Province Media Office, 18 February 2017, accessed 18 February 2017 at
https://justpaste.it/13m7n; and Islamic State, “ISHS: Healthcare services,” Raqqa Province Media
Office, 24 April 2015, accessed 3 May 2017 at https://videopress.com/v/ZloTFd6Y.
91 Winter, “Documenting the virtual ‘caliphate.’”
92 Charlie Winter, “The ISIS propaganda decline,” ICSR Insight, 23 March 2017, accessed 3 May
2017 at http://icsr.info/2017/03/icsr-insight-isis-propaganda-decline/.
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operations and bomb sites—and that is not to mention the content emerging
from overseas affiliates.93 Indeed, even in early 2017 after many of its
global branches had become dormant, depictions of snowy mountains in
Afghanistan, rocket fire in Yemen, ambushes in Nigeria, and intelligence
operations in Egypt were almost as ubiquitous as the above.94
As its territorial integrity crumbled across 2016 and 2017, the
Islamic State’s propagandistic claims became much more audacious. Its
media officials increasingly indulged in military denialism while
celebrating their organization’s overseas terrorist “victories” and bundling
adversaries together, regardless of whether they were allies or enemies of
each other.95 However, this did not necessarily mean that their efforts were
less effective. Regardless of the credulity of the Islamic State narrative, true
believers continued to embrace it, just as adversaries appeared to remain
inhibited by it. In this sense, the overarching message of the Islamic State’s
An activist in Raqqa reported to the author that “the Islamic State broadcast news and videos
from all of its provinces and not just Raqqa.” Interview between author and Raqqa Is Being
Slaughtered Silently, 15 June 2017. See also, Islamic State, “Aspect of the Quran memorization
sessions in Tabqa,” Raqqa Province Media Office, 12 January 2017, accessed 12 January 2017 at
https://justpaste.it/12cbs; Islamic State, “The production of water pipes in the city of al-Bu Kamal,”
Euphrates Province Media Office, 12 January 2017, accessed 12 January 2017 at
https://justpaste.it/kertum2; Islamic State, “Thursday market in the town of Ma’dan to the south of
the province,” Raqqa Province Media Office, 12 January 2017, accessed 12 January 2017 at
https://justpaste.it/12cmu; Islamic State, “Garrisons on the edges of the village of Tal al-Dhahab to
the west of Hawija,” Kirkuk Province Media Office, 12 January 2017, accessed 12 January 2017 at
https://justpaste.it/12cbf; and Islamic State, “Deaths and damage from an American air raid
yesterday in New Mosul,” A’maq News Agency, 12 January 2017, http://bit.ly/2joepoE. See also
Charlie Winter and Colin Clarke, “Is ISIS breaking apart?,” Foreign Affairs, 31 January 2017,
accessed 3 May 2017 at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-01-31/isis-breaking-apart.
94 Islamic State, “The district of Mamand Achin in Nangarhar,” Khurasan Province Media Office,
23 January 2017, accessed 23 January 2017 at https://justpaste.it/12pob; Islamic State, “Targeting
Huthi positions with B10 weapons systems in Hama Laqah in Fayqa,” Baydha Province Media
Office, 6 January 2017, accessed 6 January 2017 at https://justpaste.it/1258q; Islamic State, “The
progress of battles in Yubiyya district,” West Africa Province Media Office, 30 January 2017,
accessed 30 January 2017 at https://justpaste.it/12xw5; and Islamic State, “Aspect of the work of
the Security Centre in Sinai Province,” Sinai Province Media Office, 1 April 2017, accessed 1 April
at https://justpaste.it/152wk.
95 Douglas A. Ollivant, “ISIS is losing the war,” CNN, 12 March 2016, accessed 3 May 2017 at
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/08/opinions/isis-is-losing-the-war-opinion-ollivant/; and Islamic
State, “The global alliance scrutinized and afflicted,” Raqqa Province Media Office, 2 December
2014, accessed 3 May 2017 at https://videopress.com/v/10K60v1H.
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propaganda was seemingly retarding the free formation of public opinion, a
phenomenon discussed at length by Ellul, whose theory of propaganda—
discussed below—once again presents a useful aid to evaluate the group’s
information strategy.96
For the most part, the Islamic State’s media output was what Ellul
would have regarded as “integrative” and “strategic”—that is, delivered
with a long-term socializing intent in mind—not “agitative” and
“tactical”—that is, disseminated with a view to opposing the status quo and
instigating direct action.97 To a large extent, it appears that it was circulated
in Syria and Iraq with the intent of stopping the population from
differentiating between the Islamic State’s constructed reality and fact.98 By
doing this, the propagandists could work to erase the distinction between
the individual and the mass and hobble their current and future ability to
engage—or even consider engaging—in dissent. On the one hand, terror
could be directed at the “potential enemy” as much as at the overt rebel
and, on the other, narrative believability could be cast aside entirely, as the
propagandists “mocked those under [their] control” by circulating
exaggerated claims of economic plenty, battlefield success, and, in the
Islamic State’s case at least, religious perfection.99
In this sense, the world constructed in Islamic State propaganda was
not simply used to convince subjects that the organization was on the right
path—it was equally a coercive political weapon. Besides straightforward
recruitment, it was leveraged in order to buoy morale among supporters and
entrench despair in the hearts of potential dissenters: civilian supporters
were able to distract themselves from the iniquities of caliphal rule by
looking on at the seemingly stable, fruitful lives of their brethren elsewhere;
soldiers losing ground on one front could find inspiration from victories
See Winter, “The virtual caliphate.”
For more on the application of Ellul’s theory of propaganda in the context of Islamic State media,
see Winter, “The virtual caliphate.” For further context, see also “Categories of propaganda” in
Ellul, Propaganda, 61.
98 Ellul, Propaganda, 185.
99 Aviezer Tucker, The Legacies of Totalitarianism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
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allegedly won hundreds, sometimes thousands, of miles away; and rebels
were deterred by gruesome films in which like-minded associates were
burned alive, beheaded, and drowned.100
The Islamic State’s media strategists shared much with Hitler’s
propagandists when it came to the essence of the stories they told. Indeed,
both were “remarkably ambitious” when it came to constructing reality.101
In the Nazi instance, domestic propaganda was used to portray daily life as
a utopian but sober realization of communal will, the expression of an
industrious national community that only grew in defiance and resolve,
even as the war progressed and Nazi prospects of global hegemony
diminished.102 Similarly, the Islamic State leveraged information in Iraq and
Syria to maintain the morale of military and civilian supporters and, to
adversaries with whom such utopian claims did not resonate, used it to
brand itself as unstoppable, and ruthlessly efficient. 103
However, there was one notable distinction: unlike the Nazis, who
tended to spread terror by rumor, the Islamic State wore brutality on its
sleeve.104 It is worth ruminating on this because, over the course of the last
century, most totalitarian regimes relied on the rumor mill to keep up their
climate of fear, occasionally executing dissidents in public in order to
Islamic State, “You must fight them O muwahhid,” Raqqa Province Media Office, 26
November 2016, accessed 3 May 2017 at http://heavy.com/news/2016/11/new-isis-islamic-stateamaq-news-video-you-must-fight-them-o-muwahhid-english-execution-terrorism-knife-attackslaughtering-tutorial-video-raqqa-syria-uncensored-download-mp4/; Islamic State, “Making of
ilusion [sic],” Khayr Province Media Office, 12 September 2016, accessed 3 May 2017 at
http://heavy.com/news/2016/09/new-isis-islamic-state-amaq-news-video-the-making-of-illusioniraqi-army-soldiers-shia-shiite-eid-al-adha-meat-hook-execution-throat-slitting-full-uncensoredyoutube-video-download-mp4/; and Islamic State, “But if you return, we will return III,” Nineveh
Province Media Office, 19 November 2016, accessed 3 May 2017 at
https://videopress.com/v/5JUNCbOj.
101 Welch, “Volksgemeinschaft,” 213.
102 Welch, The Third Reich, 135; Speier, “Decline,” 358; and Jay Gonen, The Roots of Nazi
Psychology: Hitler’s Utopian Barbarism, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 2003, 54.
103 Welch, “Volksgemeinschaft,” 217. For more on Nazi propaganda that was directed toward
adversaries, see Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War, 1939-1945: Organisations, Policies and
Publics in Britain and Germany, London: Faber and Faber, 2011.
104 Julius Yourman, “Propaganda techniques within Nazi Germany,” The Journal of Education
Sociology 13 (1939), 156; and Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 438.
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underline it—propaganda was rarely used to overtly terrorize the masses
with threats of violence.105 In the Islamic State context, though, extreme
violence was something that the propagandists reveled in. Indeed, besides
the executions and amputations that were frequently staged in town squares
across its heartlands, the organization produced countless videos in which
prisoners of war and civilian hostages alleged to have been spies were
flamboyantly put to death—beheaded, exploded, drowned, burned, or
dismembered.106
Upon reflection, it seems that the Islamic State might have deemed
brutality, visualized with Hollywood-esque attention to detail, to be a way
to politically outmaneuver its rivals. As Hannah Arendt noted in 1970, civil
violence occurs most when political actors want to demonstrate power.107 It
follows that, if a given political actor needed to compensate for structural
disadvantages—namely, if it was an insurgent group operating in a highly
contested theater—violent propaganda could be used to amplify this
demonstration of power. In the Islamic State’s case, it apparently
determined that encouraging discrete, dispersed pockets of civilians to
attend executions and amputations, while a start, did not have sufficient
impact. The group appeared to have calculated that, in order to better sustain
the proto-state project, its coercive capabilities needed not only to be
implied but advertised, too. Thus, it used propaganda to magnify and
multiply the meting out of capital punishments, be it to “criminals” or
105

As noted in Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1966;
see also Fyodor Vasilevich Mochulsky, Gulag Boss: A Soviet Memoir, translated by Deborah
Kaple, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; and Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics
of Modern Iraq, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
106 Islamic State, “Story of slaughter,” Euphrates Province Media Office, 28 June 2016, accessed 5
May 2017 at https://videopress.com/v/1yeG306X; Islamic State, “Killing the apostates in revenge
for the monotheists II,” Khurasan Province Media Office, 9 August 2015, accessed 5 May 2017 at
https://videopress.com/v/2cz8RUw1; Islamic State, “The procession of light,” Nineveh Province
Media Office, 3 January 2017, accessed 5 May 2017 at https://videopress.com/v/L1IVFht3; Islamic
State, “Healing of the believers” chests,” Furqan Foundation, 3 February 2017, accessed 5 May
2017 at https://archive.org/download/AlFurqaanMediaHealingTheBelieversChests; and Islamic
State, “Deterring the spies I,” Dijla Province Media Office, 16 June 2015, accessed 5 May 2017 at
https://videopress.com/v/zorr50Lu.
107 Hannah Arendt, On Violence, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1970, 56.
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“traitors.” In sum, the ability to mass-mediate acts of brutality was just as
instrumental to the Islamic State as the acts of brutality themselves.
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VII. Conclusion
In the summer of 2014, the Islamic State became the new bête noire
of salafi-jihadist terrorism. In a matter of weeks, it went from being a
relatively unknown entity to one that was perpetually in the headlines,
globally notorious for the extent of its military might and brutality. While
this was in no small part due to its capture of large swaths of Iraq and
Syria—most notably the city of Mosul—the role of online propaganda in
projecting and amplifying its menace was undeniable. For that reason, in
the immediate aftermath of its advances, the group’s online media
operations were scrutinized by governments, academics, and journalists
alike. However, this scrutiny, while prudent, was too myopic, and ended up
distracting observers from what was happening in the caliphate heartlands,
where, in a manner distinctly reminiscent of some twentieth-century
totalitarian regimes, the Islamic State was weaponizing information offline
just as enthusiastically as it was online. As this case study has demonstrated,
media dissemination and censorship were being manipulated in tandem by
the group, complemented by a carefully constructed portrayal of caliphate
“reality.”
Clearly, the Islamic State’s media strategists were aware of the
power of information. While they were not in a position to exert the level
of control that, say, the Nazis enjoyed in Germany prior to and during World
War II, they did strive towards an information monopoly of which Hitler
would have been proud. Operating gradually in order to avoid alienating the
local population, they developed a sophisticated and resilient media
delivery infrastructure in places where it was lacking; produced a constant,
multimedia flood of propaganda; disabled channels through which
adversaries could communicate with the masses; and concocted their own
all-encompassing version of existence. Through the lens of their totalitarian
information operations, the Islamic State caliphate was framed as allpowerful: uncontested, inevitable, and unassailable.
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In light of this, there is a distinct possibility that the greatest
challenge to emerge from the Islamic State’s propaganda operations in
recent years may only become apparent in the long term. Without
comprehensive survey data from inside the caliphate heartlands of Iraq and
Syria, it is not possible to gauge the extent to which the Islamic State was
able to permanently alter public opinion in the region on a mass scale.
However, we can be confident that the cumulative effect of years of
indoctrination operations will not simply evaporate, even if the Islamic
State, as an overt organization, eventually disintegrates. Ideas, unlike
armies, cannot be beaten with bullets, and there can thus be little doubt that
the after-effects of the group’s carefully systematized strategic
communication endeavors will long outlive its military might.
It therefore serves to think about what could follow the Islamic
State’s eventual defeat—even if, at the time of writing in Spring 2017, it is
still a long way off.108 Without effective counter-ideological measures, the
prospects of an Islamic State resurgence will be extremely high. Even if the
organization ceases to control territory, its supporters could go on to act as
incubators for the caliphate idea and facilitate its re-emergence as soon as
conditions allow. Lest it be forgotten, the group has risen from the ashes of
defeat once before.109
It is beyond the scope of this study to propose a comprehensive
strategy for mitigating this threat, but there are multiple historic and
contemporary contexts from which practitioners—both policy makers and
warfighters—could learn. Take, for example, Germany, which at the end of
World War II was home to millions of Nazi Party members. In an effort to
lessen the long-term destabilizing threat they presented in the years that
followed the Third Reich’s demise, a far-reaching set of denazification
108

While the group lost a number of key strongholds as of the time of writing in 2017—including
the cities of Mosul and Tal’afar in Iraq—it remained a deeply entrenched force in eastern Syria,
one that would not easily be dislodged.
109 Craig Whiteside, “War, interrupted, part I: The roots of the jihadist resurgence in Iraq,” War on
the Rocks, 5 November 2014, accessed 5 June 2017 at https://warontherocks.com/2014/11/warinterrupted-part-i-the-roots-of-the-jihadist-resurgence-in-iraq/.
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policies was implemented by the Allies. For the most part, they were built
upon foundations of collective guilt and were thus deeply unpopular with
the German people.110 For that reason among others, many of the most
sophisticated initiatives were largely ineffectual. With this in mind, Allied
denazification may be more fruitful as an example of what not to do, rather
than serve as a prototype for what works. However, even if these policies
were often counterintuitive, stabilization-focused practitioners should still
examine the post-war German context, for it serves as one of just a few
examples in history of post-totalitarian mass de-indoctrination.
It would also be prudent to examine successful cases of post-war
reconciliation in Africa, particularly those that came in the aftermath of
conflicts involving cultic fighting groups and heavily indoctrinated child
soldiers. After all, while the Islamic State’s salafi-jihadist ideology hardly
compares with that of groups like Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army,
the way that both use pseudo-religious beliefs and millenarian principles to
coerce support and maintain adherence is at times strikingly similar.111
In any case, moving forward, those engaging in stabilization and
deradicalization in post-Islamic State Iraq and Syria will be entering into
largely unchartered territory—and, for that reason, it is crucial that they
learn as much as possible from history. This is all the more important given
that stabilization models developed for the post-Islamic State context will
increasingly be required in other scenarios. After all, while the Islamic State
may currently be the most notorious, it is not the only transnational salafijihadist group to be in control of large territories—far from it. One only
needs look to Nigeria, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria to find other examples of
where comprehensive post-conflict counter-indoctrination strategies could
well be required in years to come.

110

Brian Puaca, Learning Democracy: Education Reform in West Germany, 1945-1965, New
York: Berghahn Books, 2009, 34.
111 Eleanor Beevor, “Coercive radicalization: Charismatic authority and the internal strategies of
ISIS and the Lord’s Resistance Army,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 40 (2017), 496-521.
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Discussion Questions
1. Why should we pay attention to this old-fashioned form of indoctrination
when the issue of online propaganda and recruitment is in the headlines?
2. How does in-theater indoctrination differ in terms of target audience,
reach, and impact compared on online indoctrination? In particular,
which audiences does offline strategic communication target?
3. What are other effective methods of in-theater indoctrination and why
would groups chose to use them?
4. What is the relationship between in-theater and online indoctrination,
and why would armed groups devote resources to one versus the other?
How do external terrorism attacks—Propaganda of the Deed—figure in
this dynamic?
5. What internal and external skills and circumstances allowed the Islamic
State to operate with this degree of latitude? Were those unique to that
organization?
6. What outward evidence suggests that this systematic propaganda
machine is being used?
7. What are the limitations of studying propaganda by using propaganda?
What issues arise from working with the source materials to which we
have access?
8. How can a systematic internal propaganda machine be organized?
9. How can a systematic internal propaganda system be disrupted?
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10. How did the Islamic State adapt to disruption and resistance?
11. What are the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the system or underlying
premises? What are the limitations of this system, and how can they be
exploited?
12. Given the evidence in this case study, how embedded is the Islamic State
ideology in the areas where Islamic State occupied? Will their ideas
simply wash away, or are there deep seams of indoctrinated underground
cadres? Can we know?
13. Has the Islamic State changed the perceptions of more than just “true
believers” in its ranks? Does this bode ill for the region and elsewhere?
What local, regional, and international implications does this have for
the U.S.?
14. Under what circumstances and with what adaptations could this model
be replicated by the Islamic State in another area? Are any other Salaafijihadist groups using propaganda in a similar manner? (i.e., AQAP,
AQIM, Al-Shabab?)
15. At the operational level, what short- and long-term implications does this
have for intervention in areas held or once held by the Islamic State?
16. At the strategic and international level, what short- and long-term
implications does this have for intervention in areas held or once held by
the Islamic State?
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